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CHARLES N. BROWER*
The choice between litigation and arbitration where sovereigns are
involved frequently is more apparent than real. A reasoned choice can be
made only when dispute settlement provisions are consciously being negoti-
ated in good faith between willing parties, either as part of a prospective
contract for which both sides hope or to clarify established relations which
they fervently wish to continue, Otherwise fate or happenstance, depending
on your philosophical predisposition, has already determined the dispu-
tants' course.
To assist the decisional process in the all too rare instances in which it is
permitted to flourish I would like today to discuss three problems that have
arisen in international arbitration in recent years, particularly affecting the
United States or its interests. They are concrete problems that I have been
required to address in the course of actually arbitrating and litigating both
for and against foreign sovereigns, working under ICC Rules, I in ICSID-
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,2 and pursu-
ant to the slightly modified UNCITRAL Rules provisionally adopted by
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.3 In discussing them I would like
also to propose how the American Bar Association might contribute to their
solution. The three problems are (1) enforcement of foreign awards under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),4 (2) pre-award attachment
in the United States under the New York Convention,5 and both provi-
sional attachment and enforcement under the New York Convention wher-
ever the conventional municipal jurisdictional predicates are absent.
Let us turn to the distinctly United States problems first.
1. Enforcement offoreign arbitral awards in the United States under the
*Mr. Brower practices law in Washington, D.C.
'5 J.WETrER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS 89-104 (1979).
'Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, done at Washington Mar. 18, 1965,
17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force for the United States
Oct. 14, 1966).
'Declaration of Government of Algeria concerning the Settlement of Claims by the United
States and Iran, initialed on Jan. 19, 1981, art. III, reprinted in C. BROWER, L. MARKS & J.
OLSON, AFTER ALGIERS: PROTECTING AND PERFECTING AMERICAN CLAIMS AGAINST IRAN
10 (Law & Business, Inc. 1981).
'Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1330, 1391, 1491, 1602-111 (Supp.
1982).
'Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New
York June 10, 1958. 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. (entered intoforcefor the
United States Dec. 29, 1970).
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FSIA. It is common knowledge that the Liamco case 6 raised but did not
finally resolve the issue of whether a foreign arbitral award obtained by a
domestic American corporation against a foreign sovereign can be enforced
in the United States solely on the basis of the implied waiver provision of
the FSIA.7 Previously such an award had been enforced on that basis with-
out any question, in the Ipitrade case.8 The same question was posed, but
also was not decided by the District of Columbia Circuit in the Republic of
Guinea case. 9
Whether or not it is decided, and regardless of which way it is decided, is
this not an issue which is eminently susceptible of-indeed cries out for-
final resolution by legislative action? Since the Supreme Court reversed the
Second Circuit in Verlinden ,1 one is not constitutionally precluded from
correcting the situation as to awards issued in foreign arbitrations involving
only aliens, and corrective legislation could be attempted there as well as
for the benefit of our own nationals. Of course other constitutional limita-
tions-specifically that of due process I '-may, as has also been argued,'
2
limit our reach, but should we not ask Congress to make it clear that we
intend to reach as far as we can? Does not the fact that the United States is
a party to the New York Convention bolster our ability to reach far, as we
have done to implement the ICSID Convention?'
3
Since international arbitration, particularly involving sovereigns, is
designed to provide a sort of "universal" system of dispute resolution,
unlimited by individual nations' jurisdictional concepts, does not such arbi-
tration best prosper where enforcement is correspondingly universal,
unconstrained by municipal jurisdictional limitations? I submit that the
cause of international arbitration would indeed be advanced, especially the
sovereign arbitrations essential to increased international investment and
trade, if the United States would legislatively clarify that to the fullest
'Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175
(D.D.C. 1980), vacated, Nos. 80-1207, 80-1252 (D.C. Cir. May 6, 1980).
'28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (Supp. 1982).
'1pitrade International, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C.
1978).
'In re Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d
1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
'°Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
'U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 35-37, Libyan American Oil Co. v.
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, Nos. 80-1207, 80-1252 (D.C. Cir. 1980), reprinted
in, 20 I.L.M. 161, 163-64 (1981).
322 U.S.C. § 1650(a) provides, without further jurisdictional requirements, that
[An award of an arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to chapter IV of the [ICSID] conven-
tion shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United States. The pecuniary obliga-
tions imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and
credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the
several States. The Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § Iet seq. ) shall not apply to enforce-
ment of awards rendered pursuant to the convention.
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extent constitutionally permissible a foreign arbitral award is enforceable in
the United States.
2. Pre-award attachment in the United States under the New York Conven-
lion. 14 The second problem I address is likewise, I submit, one that the
United States can legislate away, even though a treaty is involved.
While foreign courts have held without exception that the New York
Convention does not preclude pre-award attachment,' 5 a result in which
recent academic authority concurs,16 there is an unfortunate split of author-
ity in the United States, with the Third Circuit taking the lead against such
remedy in the McCreary case 17 and the principal contrary authority, the
Uranex case,' 8 issuing out of the Northern District of California. Unpre-
dictability on this score is heightened by the fact that authorities differ even
within the important Southern District of New York. 19
While the point may be of somewhat limited value as to sovereigns, given
the fact that under the FSIA"prejudgment" attachment is obtainable only if
there is an express waiver,20 it is nonetheless important: where an arbitra-
tion clause can be negotiated, perhaps a waiver can be obtained, too (albeit
only before a dispute arises); furthermore, immunity waivers in United
States FCN treaties2' may be held either to be applicable in place of the
FSIA22 or to meet the standard of explicitness.23 Given the potential
importance of preliminary attachment in the pursuit of remedies against
sovereigns, particularly in light of their extensive ability to immunize their
assets, 24 it would be in the interests of American claimants that they clearly
"The question of whether such attachment is permitted by the ICSID Convention is beyond
the scope of this paper.
"Judgment of May 12, 1977, Corte cass. Italy, 17 Rassenga dell' Arbitrato 149 (unpub-
lished); The Rena K, I L.R. 545 (Q.B. 1978).
"A. JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, at 139-44
(1981).
"McCreary Tire & Light Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032 (3rd Cir. 1974); see also
I.T.A.D. Associates, Inc. v. Podar Brothers, 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981); Cordoba Shipping
Co. v. Maro Shipping Ltd., 494 F. Supp. 183, 188 (D. Conn. 1980).
"Carolina Power & Light Co. v. URANEX, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Cooper v.
Ateliers De La Motobecane, S.A., 456 N.Y.S. 2d 728 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1982).
"Compare Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Andre & CIE, S.A., 430 F. Supp. 88, 91-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), Compania de Navegacion y Financiera Bosnia, S.A. v. National Unity
Marine Salvage Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), Atlas Chartering Services, Inc. v.
World Trade Group, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), Paramount Carriers Corp. v.
Cook Industries, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 599, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), Filia Compania Naviera, S.A. v.
Petroship, S.A., No. 81 Civ. 7515, Slip op. at I I (S.D.N.Y. March 19, 1982) with Metropolitan
World Tanker Corp. v. P.N. Pertambangen Minjak Dan Gas Bumi Nasional, 427 F. Supp. 2
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
2028 U.S.C. § 1610(d)(1) (Supp. 1982).
2 Eg., Treaty of Amity, done Aug. 8, 1955, United States-Iran, U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853
(entered into force June 16, 1957).
2228 U.S.C. § 1604 (Supp. 1982) makes the FSIA "[slubject to existing international agree-
ments to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act. See
Behring Int'l., Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 699 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1983).
"Cf. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nationale Costa Rica, 676 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1982).
Eg., 28 U.S.C. § 161 I(b)(1) (Supp. 1982) immunizes "the property... of a foreign central
bank or monetary authority held for its own account .. "
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have the right to obtain pre-award attachments.
The issue here is one of interpretation of the New York Convention,
hence one might think that the proper remedy is to amend or add a clarify-
ing protocol to the convention. In fact this has been considered, 25 but the
effort involved and the time lost in revising a convention to which the
United States became a party only twelve years after its adoption is justifia-
bly intimidating. Moreover, it seems unnecessary, since only American
courts-and only some of those-have disallowed pre-award attachment.
If the view of foreign courts and qualified academicians alike is that pre-
award attachment is wholly compatible with the convention, cannot the
United States by amending chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which
implements the convention, clarify the situation domestically without
breaching its international obligations?
I respectfully suggest that a very limited "International Arbitration
Improvements Act of 1982" could speedily and correctly fill both gaps just
discussed.
3. Enforcement and provisional attachment where the municipally pre-
scribedjurisdictional predicates for a plenary action are absent. The third
problem I have mentioned is not so readily solved.
In pursuit of sovereigns around the world I have made an interesting
discovery. In a number of countries parties to the New York Convention
(including the United States) courts ordinarily will not entertain a plenary
action solely on the basis of presence of the prospective defendant's assets.
If neither the plaintiff nor the sovereign defendant has any connection with
the forum, and the matter giving rise to the dispute is likewise wholly
detached from forum state interests, jurisdiction simply does not exist, or
will not be exercised. If no plenary action can be entertained, then no pro-
visional attachment is available. By extension of these principles, such
states may well refuse to entertain an action to enforce an arbitral award
under the New York Convention and likewise refuse provisional
attachment.
This makes familiar sense in a judicial context, but does it where interna-
tional arbitration is involved? I think not. A sovereign and an alien agree
to arbitrate as a kind of universal, non-national means of resolving a. dis-
pute. The point of the New York Convention, where it applies, is to ensure
fulfillment of the arbitrating parties' expectations by guaranteeing world-
wide enforcement of a legitimate award. Under the circumstances just iter-
ated those expectations in fact would be frustrated: a claimant could
pursue a sovereign arbitral respondent only in those fora where he could
25In 1976 the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee invited the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law to consider a Protocol clarifying and complementing
the convention. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/127. See also A. JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK
ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, at 1-2 (1981).
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have reached him anyhow, in the absence of an arbitration agreement.
Is this what the New York Convention contemplated? It certainly does
not appear so from the text of the convention. Article III explicitly
provides:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce
them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is
relied upon under the conditions laid down in the following articles.
The "conditions laid down" subsequently in the convention include nothing
remotely resembling satisfaction of traditional municipal jurisdictional
requirements. Therefore a nonenforcing state as I have described it would
be justified only if its jurisdictional rules are deemed subsumed under the
rubric "rules of procedure." I have searched high and low for any authority
which would either confirm or refute the conclusion that failure to enforce
in the described circumstances constitutes a breach of the convention.
Amazingly, at least to me, I have not even found any discussion of the issue.
The little relevant commentary, however, confirms that the reference to
"rules of procedure" was intended to mean things such as "the form of
request" for enforcement and designation of the "competent authority" to
which to apply for enforcement, 26 and not municipal jurisdictional
principles.
If the situation I have described persists, is not the advantage of interna-
tional arbitration diminished, perhaps dissipated? If a party can only
enforce where he could have sued anyhow, has he gained enough advan-
tage through consent to arbitration to outweigh having added a further pro-
cedure, i.e., enforcement, without expanding his access to assets out of
which to satisfy the award?
I realize this is an area in which the United States is not pure, as the
earlier discussion of the "LIMCO problem" acknowledges. I think, how-
ever, a suggestion for the future is in order. Assuming that the United
States were to succeed in setting its own course correctly, as previously dis-
cussed, could we not also seek to persuade others to do the same? If it is
indeed concluded that the New York Convention requires "universal"
enforcement, irrespective of the usual jurisdictional principles applied by a
state party, could not the same "International Arbitration Improvements
Act of 1982" direct the president or his delegate to so inform other states
parties diplomatically and seek to build support for this interpretation of
the convention?
Obviously, many questions are raised by such a proposal. Its object, on
all three points, is to provoke thought, discussion, and eventually action. It
is important that the process begin. I know of no organization better placed
26A. JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, at 236-43
(1981).
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to initiate that process than the American Bar Association, especially its
Section of International Law and Practice, and most particularly that Sec-
tion's Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, whose sponsor-
ship of this program I applaud.
